by Cristiana Era
One of the news that does not seems to have received much attention by the Italian public opinion is the one regarding the development of the terrorist network of al-Qaida in the Maghreb area, notwithstanding the recent release by an AQMI group (al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique) of an Italian tourist, Maria Sandra Mariani, who was kidnapped in south Algeria more than one year ago. Another Italian citizen is currently in the hands of al-Qaida in Algeria, and in 2009 Sergio Cicala and his wife were whipped off by the same faction in Mauritania. Italians are not the only terrorists’ target. In fact, all foreigners and local prominent personalities are. But besides the kidnappings, what is being overlooked by many is the increased presence of al-Qaida members and their growing organizational capabilities. Focused on the exit strategy from the Afghan quagmire, concerned about the Syrian developments, and domestically constrained by economic issues, the international community is probably underestimating the phoenix nature of terrorism, even though decision makers are aware of the African situation.
The killing of Osama bin Laden, the first charismatic leader and unquestioned symbol of radical Islam, is a victory as long as his death is a breakthrough in the fight to international terrorism. And this might have been the case during the first years of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. As the conflict took a long turn, the Taliban managed to build up a sound and efficient organizational structure, relying on external support not only from nearby countries, but also from small terrorist cells from the Maghreb countries. Most of those foreign combatants, who took advantage of the training offered in Afghanistan in the Taliban’s safe havens, are now back in their countries. Many of them were Libyans, who took part to the rebellion against Muhammar Qaddafi and that are now seeking to increase their power in order to build up an Islamic State, filling in the governance vacuum that is still plaguing the country.
The efforts of the jihadists to expand their influence from North and Eastern Africa to the West seems to find a favorable ground in the political turmoil affecting a region that is well known for its instability and insecurity; a domestic unrest that has characterized even those countries that were regarded as the guardians against possible destabilizing factors, like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The Arab Spring unveiled the fragility of such a balance.
As a matter of fact, the jihadist movement in North Africa originated in Algeria, which was shaken by the internal conflict after ruling regime banned the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut Islamiq) in 1992, in the aftermath of the legislative elections. FIS was composed by several armed groups, of which the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) was the most renowned. Eventually, AQMI developed from a splinter Salafist group of GIA, shifting actions and objectives from the Algerian national boundaries to the area of central Sahara. AQMI has been considered a weak movement and it is not hierarchically organized, the command structure is not well defined and the headquarters does not control all its sub-groups. As a consequence, the organization’s leaders often struggle among themselves for power and prestige. Moreover, its ties to al-Qaeda were unclear until recently, leading some to suspect that the al-Qaida affiliation claims were just a propaganda tool to gain international attention. Messages from Bin Laden, supporting the kidnapping of foreigners at the end of 2010, and requests of French troops withdrawal from Afghanistan revealed the existence of those ties, even though AQMI acts independently from al-Qaeda.
Drug trafficking and kidnappings are the major sources of revenue for the movement, whose activity is expanding outside the central Sahara countries (mostly Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger), and it can be expected that the financial resources it can count on will enable the group to improve its logistic organization – including recruitment - and to carry out terrorist attacks destabilizing the Northern Africa area.
The shift from collecting resources to political action will not take a long time, if the social and political uncertainty affecting North and West African countries are not adequately addressed by the countries’ leadership. Unemployment, corruption, lack of security, and declining economies are frustrating the Maghreb and Sahara populations who might turn their support to radical Islamic groups like AQMI. This could be the case of Mali, for example, where a longtime conflict between the Tuareg ethnic group in the north of the country and the central government still persists. The Tuareg are seeking independence from Bamako, after the central government refused for years to support the development of the north. In this case, there are reports of AQMI attempts to infiltrate the Tuareg groups.
The activity of the terrorist group in central Sahara has seized the attention of the United States. Washington is monitoring the developments through AFRICOM (US Africa Command) and is cooperating for the improvement of intelligence, command and control, border control and logistics with Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.
The threat is real and the challenge for the national and international decision makers is to ensure that social and economic demands raised in many countries of the area are met. Otherwise we could witness the rise of a terrorist organization as a viable political alternative in the opinion of those populations. Can the international community afford it?
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